TAB

Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150015-5

EXTERNAL RESEARCH PAPER

Soviet Reaction to American Foreign Policy

By

Dr. Franz Borkenau

EXTERNAL RESEARCH STAFF
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
Series 3, No. 89
March 21, 1952

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

C O N T E N T S

FOREWORD

The paper presented here was prepared at the request of the External Research Staff by Dr. Franz Borkenau. Dr. Borkenau is the author of World Communism, A History of the Communist International (1939) and a new book on European Communism which will be published sometime this year.

Many papers so acquired are unique MSS contributed by the authors before publication. Some are reproduced for circulation in the Department, but whether or not they are so reproduced, the Department takes no responsibility for the contents. The opinions expressed and the treatment of material are entirely those of the author, circulated without change in accord with the objective of the program to make available to the Department the knowledge and opinion of private scholars.

This paper has been catalogued and added to the collection of the Division of Libraries and Reference Services (LR). Any questions about the paper or about related research being carried on by the individual or institution that produced it should be referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick, Code 191, extension 5492.

PART I

RUSSIAN EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING FUTURE AMERICAN POLICY

There is very little factual information on this subject. Therefore, all statements concerning it have a highly speculative character. However, certain basic assumptions are permissible, primarily because we do have information about the Russian approach to politics in general.

Since the end of World War II, the West has been harassed by the worry, "What will Stalin do?" Again and again, Europe and America have believed the Russians to be on the brink of attack. For a long time, the thoughts of the West were concentrated not on whether Stalin wanted to attack, whether he could at any time attack, but merely when he would attack. Only the communist failure in Korea has to some extent dissipated these fears.

As a starting point of our investigation, we should beware of imputing to our adversary modes of thought similar to our own. Communism is a creed which is self-centered to the point of megalomania. Whereas for decades the West has had the deplorable habit of taking for granted that the initiative would rest with its enemies, communism (like nazism) thinks purely in terms of, "What are we going to do next." In principle, the communists view the actions of the enemy as only a vain striving after the impossible. For the communists the question, basically, is not what will the enemy do next, but what will the enemy attempt to do but fail to achieve. These Marxist habits of thought have a religious quality. In the top leaders these habits may to some extent be balanced by scepticism and the realism taught by experience. However, their basic importance should not be overlooked.

Since, in the communist view, the initiative is, historically and philosophically, always with the communists, any action their adversaries may take is viewed not as a key fact from which they should take their cue, but merely as an interruption, an incident in the course of their own advance. Therefore, the policy adopted by the U.S.A. since the outbreak of the Korean war will be viewed very differently by the communist mind than by ourselves. The communists will not ask themselves: How far will America go in its politico-military offensive, and what can we do to defend ourselves (as the West asked itself first with regard to the Hitlerite and then to the Stalinite danger). The query which is the object of investigation in the Politburo will rather run thus: To what extent is this newest American policy at variance with our previous expectations; to what extent does it therefore interfere with our plans; what must we do to secure the progress of these plans despite somewhat altered conditions? This, I believe, every member of the Politburo and every well-trained communist would regard as the "Bolshevik way" of putting the question.

It is therefore impossible to analyse communist reactions to the present, more active military-political policy of the U.S.A. without first analysing the communists' own plans. And in this field, at least, we are on much firmer ground than in speculating about Russian reactions to the present initiative of the U.S.A.

Chapter 1.

Russian Plans -- Long-term or Short-term?

Today the view is increasingly accepted that from the final period of World War II up to 1948, deep divergences of opinion existed within the Politburo about the international policy to be adopted. These controversies are usually connected, and we believe correctly so, with the name of Zhdanov on the one hand, and the names of Beriya and Malenkov on the other. The struggle came to an end, for the time being at least, with the sudden death of Zhdanov. There emerged a basic policy decision which has guided Russian policy ever since, and is, I believe, still guiding it. Investigation of the debate which preceded that policy decision will therefore provide us with insight into basic Russian strategy.

The basic decision made in 1948 clearly consisted of two resolves. The first of these resolves was not to go to war against the West in the near future. The second was to shift the pivot of the communist attack from Europe to Asia. The first of these two decisions was embodied in at least three major political withdrawals: 1) the toleration of Tito's revolt without taking armed action, 2) the toleration of the Berlin air-lift without military interference, and 3) the toleration of the Finnish refusal to sign more than a merely formal military pact with Russia. These three actions, all of which followed within a few months the communist coup in Prague (the high-water mark of the communist offensive) marked a total reversal of previous policy. However, these withdrawals were amply balanced by the start of Mao's triumphal progress (with only slight support from Russia). Although counsels of caution prevailed even in the Asian field, there was a change of policy implied which was no less staggering than that in Europe. Up to this point, Moscow seems to have regarded Mao as a minor satellite with no more than limited chances of success. Now, his actions became the pivotal point of communist world policy, and have remained so ever since.

I believe it is possible, not only to discern the policy decision of 1948, but also the main motives which prompted it. These are again two in number. Part of the debate preceding the decision was carried through in public, between Vosnesensky, Zhdanov's chief spokesman in the economic field, and Eugene Varga, who, oddly enough, attacked with impunity what was then the official party doctrine - something he could hever have done without support from the highest quarter. Vosnesensky had maintained a) that the West was confronted with imminent economic collapse and b) that in terms of war potential the communist bloc was already superior to the West.

Varga demonstrated that the first of these two statements was nonsense. Although not as openly discussed as the first, it can be taken for granted that the second statement was also emphatically rejected. In a word, the "war party" had refused to recognize America's industrial strength and Russia's relative industrial weakness. The "party of caution" had insisted, realistically, on the enormous gap in the war potential of the two camps and had got its point of view accepted.

It should be remembered that throughout his career, Stalin has insisted on steel production and machine construction as the two key points of power. It follows from this view, in conjunction with the Varga debate and the policy decision of 1948, that Russia does not intend to go to full-scale war until the steel and machine-building gap between the two blocs is at least considerably narrowed. Present Russian plans contemplate a steel production of sixty million tons by 1960, which, together with satellite production, might be about half of what the West will then produce. Therefore, it follows that probably not even 1960 would be welcome to the Kremlin as the first year of World War III. Considerations of this kind may not have been decisive as long as the "enrages" (Zhdanov and his group) carried weight with the Politburo. Under the present dispensation, they can be assumed to be decisive and they argue in favor of a very long-term policy of the Kremlin.

It follows from the industrial aspects of the situation that the main aim of the Kremlin is to gain time. Any American move in the field of rearmament will therefore be judged in the Kremlin primarily on the basis of whether the move makes it more difficult to gain time. It may be assumed that present American rearmament does appear to the Kremlin as such a difficulty, possibly a quite serious one. But it also follows that this rearmament cannot produce a major change in Russian policy as laid down in 1948. For if our analysis is correct, then the decision of 1948 already involved systematic caution, even at a high price (Tito, Berlin, Finland) in order to avoid war at present at almost any cost. Growing actual American strength can only produce an even stronger emphasis on caution in the Kremlin. This, I believe, is borne out both by Russian foreign policy and by the conduct of the communist parties during 1951.

We will turn now to the second element in the decision of 1948. Obviously, the Politburo gave as much consideration to political as to industrial matters. Obviously, the conclusion was reached that revolutionary and subversive trends in the non-communist world were not remotely strong enough to balance the deficiencies in war potential. This insight must have been closely connected with the simultaneous shift of the pivot of the communist offensive to the East as the zone much more easy to subvert. It may be assumed that at this time the Politburo decided on a policy whose full meaning is only now gradually emerging, the policy of subverting all Asia before returning to the attack on Europe, the policy probably implicit in the recently emerging term of "socialist encirclement." "Narrow the industrial gap; encircle the West by a wave of revolutions of the under-developed nations; in the meantime avoid war at almost any cost!" - this must be the formula of the Kremlin. It will be helpful, however, to expatiate at some length on the emergence of the present Russian assessment of the political, as distinct from the industrial, relation of forces.

It is demonstrable that the Politburo never regarded the Teheran and Yalta zones of influence as more than a bluff. Since 1943, the communists had been busy at the task of securing complete political control of the whole of continental Europe. This statement applies, in the first instance, to France. The slogans and the techniques of the underground communists in France did not differ in the slightest from those applied in Eastern Europe. They culminated in a determined effort to capture power at the moment of the liberation, in the teeth of the policy of the Western powers and the Allied High Command. It was rapid action on the part of the Western armies which forestalled that plan in June/August 1944. The attempt was, however, made a second time in November 1944 when the communists simultaneously prepared and/or attempted an armed uprising in France, Belgium, and Greece. However, in the light of material now available, it is obvious that this attempt to capture power was half-hearted. In France it was abandoned in exchange for a twenty year alliance with Russia. In Belgium it was abandoned when the British commander took military action against the incipient uprising. It was carried farthest in Greece, but even there Stalin took care not to involve the USSR in any way. It may be assumed that although one party within the communist world movement (even then connected with Zhdanov and Tito) advocated decisive action, the party of caution resisted and a compromise was reached to the effect that the communists in the West should try to go as far as they could without producing a total rupture among the Big Three. The attempt was abandoned by December 1944, when the Western will to resist had been made completely clear. In the subsequent liberations of Northern Italy, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, the attempt was not repeated. Only at this time did there develop a divergence of tactics used in Eastern and Western Europe: while force was employed in the Popular Democracies of the East, permeation was the tactic used in the Western democracies.

It may be demonstrated, however, that the change of tactics in Western Europe was regarded at the time as only a small and short detour. There is sufficient evidence to prove that at least down to the spring of 1946 the French communists hoped for the "peaceful" capture of power. It was only the defeat on the second constitutional referendum which dashed their hopes. After that, a real political vacuum arose, since the communist parties of Western Europe now had no definite goal assigned for their policy. It may be assumed that it was largely this impasse, made more evident by the Marshall Plan and the consequent decline of the communists political weight, which, for the second time, helped the war party to acquire more influence within the Politburo. The result was the foundation of the Cominform, the rapid establishment of complete communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe, the Czech coup, and the mass strikes in France and Italy in 1947/1948. These attempts, however, were not prompted by a clear-cut plan to capture power in Western Europe. They, like their predecessors of 1944, suffered from some hidden inhibition, and, in consequence, had something of the character of aimless blows. Under these circumstances, the policy of the offensive could only be a failture. The full weight of its final rejection in the summer of 1948, however, is brought out by the above historical considerations. The policy of the offensive was not an incident. It had been the central topic of the internal conflicts of the Politburo since 1943. It had been twice tried, twice sabotaged from within; it had twice failed, and twice been rejected. The second time this rejection had been clinched by the catastrophe of Zhdanov and by the purge of all his close collaborators. We leave aside the connecting link between these events and the rebellion of Tito.

Chapter 2.

Short-term Aims of the Politburo

Speaking abstractly, it must appear possible to the Kremlin that present Western rearmament might lead rapidly to war, and this, in view of their own awareness of their lack of adequate preparedness, must appear as the greatest possible disaster. But what can be done to minimize this danger: not much that is not directly in the line adopted since 1949. More rearmament? An increase of effective infantry strength, that is, a partial mobilization, does not seem to be an answer, and as to an increase of war potential and war material, that is being done at top speed in any case. An increase in the power of Russian political action? There, much had already been done before the start of American rearmament. The apparent indolence of Russian policy in front of what might turn out to be an acute danger is precisely explained by the effects of the political turn of 1948, which happened to anticipate the present situation. Presumably, only the Politburo's belief in the real imminence of war could produce deviations from the present plans, and it appears that at present the Kremlin does not see any need for such last-minute measures. The reason for this is also fairly obvious.

Of course, the Kremlin knows that a war in 1953 or 1954 would be immensely dangerous to the existence of the regime, but as the Russian leaders scan the political horizon they must be heartened by a considerable number of factors which make such an event unlikely. These factors concern both the international and the internal American situations.

Korea has provided a kind of dress rehearsal for what the international situation might be at the moment of the outbreak of war, even if the case of the U.S.A. were as good and unanswerable as it was in Korea. It is generally agreed today that the communist attack on South Korea represented, to some extent, a misunderstanding. The Russian leaders thought they had reason to believe that South Korea would not be defended. Its defense was certainly a serious disappointment to them. It resulted that, once the chances of overrunning the country in one rush were gone, the only task left to the U.S.S.R. was to extricate the communist world from the involvement. The task was essentially the same as when Russia had adopted too forward a position in Berlin. However, this time the task was complicated by the presence of the Chinese. The upshot of the matter was that Korea demonstrated that Russia is bent on avoiding international war at present.

But if the American reaction to Korea was disquieting to Russia, the reaction of all other powers of the world, without exception, must have been immensely satisfying to Stalin. The outbreak of the Korean war produced the open defection of India (and Indonesia), as well as of the Arabic bloc, from the Western front. Disregarding the very special conditions still obtaining in Japan, Turkey turned out to be the only reliably pro-Western power in Asia. Worse, the situation led almost immediately to open disagreement between London and Washington, with most European powers clearly supporting London. America was left to conduct the Korean war practically alone. I do not think that we must assume that the Kremlin over-

rates these facts. They need not be repeated in the case of a great international war. But America would at least be confronted with the possibility of such a development, and in any case, with the uncertainty of all alliances. The possibility of having to "go it alone" must be recognized as a considerable handicap. I believe that it is primarily this which has determined the equanimity that Russia has displayed throughout the whole crisis. The Kremlin might even think that the facts of American action in Korea and large-scale American rearmament have been more than outweighed by the rifts appearing in the anti-communist bloc.

The same applies mutatis mutandis to the American home situation. Official Soviet propaganda pretends to regard America as a monolithic country, wholly - with the exception of a few "partisans of peace" - given to imperialist aggression. However, Communists are convinced that their own monolithic character is their decisive advantage over the capitalist world, which their doctrine represents as riven by dissension and self-contradictions. Hence, they can never really believe in the monolithic character of our side. Apart from this, the Politburo must be aware that while discipline in the lower communist ranks is indeed to some extent monolithic, the Politburo itself is not. Otherwise, it could not have passed through so many debates and struggles on sanguinary issues. And if the Kremlin does not regard itself as completely monolithic, how much less so America? It must be assumed that, although surprised by the energy of the American reaction to the attack on Korea, the Kremlin does not regard it as likely that America will go to war in the next few years.

There is little reason to assume that the violent expressions of a desire to exterminate communism root and branch have impressed the Kremlin deeply. If one can judge from basic Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, what matters to the communist strategists is not the existence of a current of anti-communist extremism in America, but the degree of unity of American public opinion. As within the international anti-communist bloc, so within the U.S.A. itself, the Korean war and its various incidents have produced violent dissensions, fierce political fights and a general political upheaval. This, the Kremlin will indubitably book on the credit side of its ledger. It must be assumed that if Stalin and his advisers have made any mistakes at all, it is in overrating the importance of these dissensions and underrating the possibility of a rapid emergence of unity in the United States.

Chapter 3.

Long-term Policies of the Politburo

One might perhaps combine the various surmises discussed above into the view that, in the eyes of the Politburo, there exists a 90% chance that Russia will be able to avoid war in the near future. The Kremlin may assume that the danger of such an occurrence will increase up to and somewhat beyond the peak of rearmament, but that even at that point, the danger will not be very large, except if, by some ill-considered action, Russia herself produces a violent reaction against communism which, if the West were feeling sufficiently strong, might lead to war. To avoid such a contingency thus becomes the primary present concern of Russian policy.

From the Kremlin's point of view, however, the situation is bound to change totally once the peak of the danger zone is passed. If caution will be the keynote during the next two years or so, the passing of the rearmament peak will give the communists new opportunities for a large-scale political offensive. In other words, it will give them the opportunity to continue the policy laid down in 1948 for the slow political disintegration of the West. Policies followed during the present transitional period are, as I shall try to show in a moment, visably geared to that long-term aim, while, at the same time, they serve the short-term aim of preventing war in the near future. In a word, the Kremlin seems to consider that there is a 90% chance that American and Western rearmament will be a mere incident which will ultimately help the Kremlin in the pursuance of their long-term policy of disrupting the anti-communist front. To see this, it is only necessary to visualize what will happen during and after the rearmament phase. Rearmament will bring additional burdens to everybody and in Europe these will reach a proportion difficult to bear. The questions of intra-European cooperation also are not likely to be easy, and, in fact, are likely to revive all kind of national antagonisms which were at the point of becoming dormant. Finally, the presence of a larger number of American troops in Europe will be popular only as long as Europe believes itself to be in imminent danger. Likewise, in America, the absence of these troops will be felt as an unnecessary burden once the imminence of danger is no longer taken for granted.

To exploit all these antagonisms and difficult problems, Russia has to do only one thing: to make the imminence of a Russian danger appear an absurdity to American and European public opinion. Down to 1950 Russia had done nothing at all to produce such a situation. On the contrary, all communist efforts were geared to producing the deceptive impression of the imminence of a Russian invasion of the European continent. At present, Russia seems for the first time to be in part abandoning her terrorist whisper campaigns, and attempting to create the impression that she genuinely wants peace. So far, this change seems not to have called forth the attention it would deserve in the West. It may soon confront us with very difficult problems.

What would happen if a well-armed West found itself confronted with a Russia cautiously avoiding any provocative action? Well, there would obviously develop an increasing mutual resentment among all constituent parts of the Western bloc. Europe would revolt against the military burden imposed on it. Its various nations would completely break apart from one another (or so the Kremlin hopes). The only connecting link remaining in Europe, would be the common dislike of European nations for the presence of foreign commands and foreign troops on their soil. In America, such a situation, as it became increasingly apparent, would provoke a still more violent division of opinion. There might be those who, regarding delay as dangerous, would violently advocate immediate war. But their voice would be drowned by the many who would see no danger and no need for continued vigilance. Whatever the proportions of the two sides, their quarrel would help Russia. It is easy to expatiate on specific developments that might follow. The communists might be able to seriously disrupt, and conquer certain territories in Asia. In Europe, Germany's attitude might be completely transformed by a victory of Schumacher, and the demand for national unity might become irresistible. In France, the present shaky majority of the center parties might collapse. English foreign

policy might become even more passive. In Italy, a great coalition against de Gasperi might come to the fore. In a word, the Kremlin would attempt, by a policy of extreme reserve, to leave the West high and dry in the ironically useless splendor of its shining armor, while ever larger parts of Asia went Communist. To put it differently, Russia might continue its policy of political disintegration with a considerably greater chance of success than before.

The Russian leaders might pin even larger hopes on economic developments. They probably think that it will be very difficult for Western Europe and America to maintain the present level of employment, if the armament program is slowed down, and, therefore, that the West might be confronted with the choice between economic depression and maintaining a uselessly high level of rearmament. I do not wish it to be misunderstood to say that all of this will happen. But some of it might well happen. The Kremlin presumably hopes for all of it to happen, and, in any case, is ready to exploit whatever targets of action that offer themselves once the peak of rearmament is reached.

To the query presented to the analyst - what would presumably be the Russian reaction to American rearmament? - the answer would therefore seem to be: A plan of action such as outlined above, a policy with two phases, beginning with extreme caution and emphatic peace propaganda, and developing - while still preserving the greatest conceivable caution - into active disruption of our camp once the peak of rearmament has been passed.

Chapter 4.

The Communist Peace Campaign - A Pointer to Russian Plans

The communist "peace" campaign represents a direct reflex of Kremlin policy with regard to the various stages of Western rearmament. Originally a hypocritical weapon of the communist offensive, it turns more and more into an instrument of self-protection as the West's ability to strike increases.

It should be remembered that the Stockholm conference of 1949 was not the beginning of the peace campaign. The campaign was outlined in Zhdanov's declaration accompanying the foundation of the Cominform. In that speech, Zhdanov attributed to American leaders a monolithic determination to go to war, an interpretation which, at the time, simply reflected Zhdanov's own determination to go to war. But, Zhdanov continued, it is one thing to wish war, and another to bring it about. The peoples of the world do not want war and will prevent America from going to war. Basically, Moscow's policy has never since deviated from that line. Its purpose, however, has changed. When stated by Zhdanov in the fall of 1947, the policy was simply aimed at paralysing the West when it was confronted with the Russian attack Zhdanov wished to launch.

The next step, taken two years later at the Stockholm conference, had a clear connection with the abandonment of the Berlin blockade. On the lips of Zhdanov,

the "peace" campaign had been no more than the embroidery of a campaign of threats and aggressions, a secondary instrument in a vast plan. After the Berlin defeat, on the basis of a long-term decision to avoid international war on a large scale, the peace campaign offered itself as the key slogan of Western communism. Yet the Zhdanovshtshina died hard and nowhere can its long-drawn-out decline be traced better than in the peace campaign. Even at the moment of the Stockholm conference, the campaign was still non-committal in several respects. In the first place, it was concentrated almost exclusively on the prohibition of the atom bomb. At that time, this corresponded well enough to the strategic situation, where the atom bomb emerged as the only decisive weapon then immediately available to the West. Limitation to the atom bomb issue implied that the campaign left Russia (even in terms of propaganda) with an entirely free hand for aggressive action. This was underlined by the struggle within the European communist parties against "economism," that is, against too strong and too genuine an insistence on the day-to-day interests of the workers. The campaign against economism was closely connected with the overthrow of Thorez (even before his incapacitation by a stroke) and seriously endangered the position of Togliatti. It implied concentration on strengthening the inner-cadres of the party - essentially a policy of preparation for civil war. In a word, Moscow had stopped urging its Western agents to violent mass movements of the type used in 1947 and 1948, but had not given up the idea of a fairly rapid approach towards a new offensive.

There followed a period of wavering, terminated by the emergence of American determination for serious action in the Korea war. The Prague and Berlin meetings of the peace movement abandoned the concentration on the atom bomb, a policy which, in view of American rearmament, no longer corresponded to the strategic situation, and replaced a merely technical disarmament program by a vast political program with detailed slogans for the outlawing of the aggressor. In these decisions, there appears for the first time a genuine apprehension about the possibility of an American attack.

But the most significant developments, which have yet hardly been grasped by public opinion, took place during the second half of 1951. The intra-party campaign against "economism" has died down, both in France and in Italy. Its chief standard bearer outside Russia, Lecoeur, has been removed from the leading position which seemed to be already in his hands. Two master tacticians, Togliatti and Duclos, have again become the first protagonists of the Kremlin in Europe. Simultaneously, after endless crises and waverings, insurrectional tactics have now been definitely abandoned in India. In India, as in Japan, the previous "proletarian" and/or "workers' and peasants' bloc" line has been replaced by the slogan of a four-power bloc, including the middle classes and the "national bourgeoisie." It was on the basis of this unadvertised but thoroughgoing change of policy that the Indian communists gained considerable success in the recent general elections. In both Iran and Egypt, Russia, while fanning the flames from backstage, has adopted a policy of conspicuous reserve. The communist parties of these two countries have carefully abstained from any direct revolutionary action such as, given similar circumstances, would have been a certainty only eighteen months ago. The fact that all these changes are performed with as little noise as possible does not diminish their importance. On the contrary, the very in-

conspicuousness of the changes bears witness to their seriousness. Without being overly worried, the Kremlin is taking care that during the "danger phase" (up to and somewhat beyond the peak of American rearmament) nothing should happen which might play into the hands of an American "war party."

Needless to say, these changes go beyond a mere avoidance of direct clashes. In India and Japan they involve an attempt to build an anti-American front so broad as to make impossible any participation of these two countries in an anti-Russian action. Perhaps more noteworthy than anything else in this field are the still hesitant and tentative attempts of Togliatti and Duclos to break out of the isolation which has surrounded the Western communist parties since the days of the Zhdanovshtshina. During the last three months solemn, though as yet unspecific, offers have been made by both parties to all other parties for genuine and faithful cooperation against war and American "domination." If the communist leaders have not yet specifically named the political groups they desire to have as allies, this is probably due to the reticence of all those they wish to win over to such an alliance. It is a common feature of these campaigns, in Europe no less than in Asia, to insist upon the communists' willingness to cooperate not only with the lower middle classes but also with the "grande bourgeoisie." In other words, since the middle of 1951, there has begun the transformation of the peace campaign from a mere propaganda appeal indiscriminately directed to all and sundry, into a more specific political campaign of seeking serious political alliances so as to remove certain countries from the Western bloc. It need hardly be emphasized that the notably friendly attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards the Churchill government is a major move in the same direction. All this naturally implies a fairly complete abandonment of the methods of threats and whisper campaigns about an imminent Russian military attack, which were still so prominent in 1950.

I believe, however, that here lies the Achilles heel of the new tactics. If Russia actually ceased to be feared, she would have no chance to impress Western Europe and Asia in any way. She must to some extent keep up the campaign, never abandoned since 1943, of creeping terrorism. Presumably, Russia at present wishes to combine many more or less alluring offers with a measure of threats. But if we know how to play our hand, the threats will get into the way of the offers, and the new communist attempts at creating broad anti-American fronts, both internationally and within the various countries of Europe and Asia will then be self-defeating.

Chapter 5.

Conclusion

Even so, it is necessary, for the general reasons indicated above, to face the fact that American rearmament does not remove the main dangers of communist policy. If our analysis is correct, American rearmament has not even changed the main outline of Russian policy. It would be a complete answer to an imminent Russian threat of war. But the war policy had been finally rejected by the Kremlin two years before American rearmament started. Consequently, this rearmament

has only strengthened trends already dominating Russian policy. It will help not only to thwart, but also to prevent local communist aggressions.

It may be assumed that communist attacks such as may develop in the near future in Indochina and Burma, will be conducted strictly within the limits compatible with Russian security and will be abandoned if they appear to lead to international war. But Russia's basic aggressive intentions are long-term, not short-term, and the main effect of American rearmament on them was apparently to concretize them. Previous to this rearmament, Russian policy was simply to prepare industrially and, at the same time, to undermine the anti-communist camp politically by combining the peace campaign with local acts of aggression. American rearmament being now a fact, the policy is more specifically geared to passing safely through a "danger zone" with the help of a policy of utmost caution. Behind this caution lurks the expectation that once American and Western rearmament has reached and over-reached its peak, brilliant possibilities of disruption of the anti-communist camp will be open to Russia.

PART II

LIMITED OBJECTIVES OF AMERICAN AND WESTERN ACTION

The question arises whether the West, and in particular the U.S.A., can do something to disrupt the Russian plan of quietly waiting for the rearmament drive to reach and overreach its peak; something, that is, which would fall short of actual international war on a large scale.

Many such opportunities did emerge in the past, when communist policy was still openly aggressive. They were not then exploited, partly because of the absence of adequate armed forces ready to back up a determined policy, and partly because of the delay in the emergence of a full consciousness of the issues in the West. Today, both the weapons and the awareness of the issues are present. But precisely for this reason Russian policy, expecially since the disappointment in Korea, has become much more cautious. It is an obvious policy to wait for provocation by the enemy and then to hit back. But precisely because we are now much more ready to react in that way, and precisely because the Kremlin apparently believes in the need of passing through a danger zone with utmost caution, fewer such opportunities are likely to arise. Let us, however, assume that certain opportunities of this kind will continue to arise.

Both in Europe and in Asia, the predominant mentality is a combination of a boundless desire for peace with the willingness to worship and to submit to strength. It is inevitable that in taking a strong line about anything we should temporarily appear as disturbers of the peace. This also applies to the Russians. Where they have taken violent action, the have paid heavily for it by rousing antagonism. If this has not led to a collapse of their political influence outside their own borders, it is because they took great trouble, each time that they used violence, to inspire simultaneously fear and reverence for their strength. It follows that it would be disastrous for our side to take sharp action without at the same time inspiring awe. A policy of ineffective and merely demonstrative "blows" would be much more disastrous than even one of meekness.

It has been asked repeatedly, and in particular with regard to the recent trial of U.S. airmen in Hungary, whether a rupture of diplomatic relations with Hungary, or even with all the satellites would be an effective answer. This contributor believes that such action would be very ill-advised. It is questionable whether it was right to pay the ransom. It might have been preferable to refuse, to take no action, but to say quietly, "We have a good memory."

What, however, would be the reaction to a rupture of diplomatic relations? It is impossible to predict how strongly the ragged nerves of Europe would react - perhaps not very strongly, in which case the blow would simply have miscarried. But assuming the reaction was lively, it would then result in a paroxysm of fear sweeping Europe, as it did after the Czech coup and at the beginning of the Berlin blockade. Such a crisis of fear must be accepted as inevitable in the case of any determined step, and need not be regarded as harmful in itself. But what if nothing followed upon the gesture?

In that case, we would have produced terrific disappointment among the masses in the satellite countries. Our prestige in these countries has in any case been harmed by Yalta and by our inability to enforce even the actual performance of what was promised at Yalta. A rupture of diplomatic relations would convey the impression that now America is willing to "do something for us," ultimately something for the liberation of this area. If nothing else happened, a further loss of prestige would result - the more so since enemy propaganda would not throw away the opportunity of first creating a war scare and of later adding triumphantly, "But they did not dare to attack us." The disappearance of the U.S. embassies and of the last consulates would then suggest that the U.S. was abandoning Eastern Europe to its fate.

Effects in the West would be no less disastrous. It can be assumed with near-certainty that few countries would follow the American lead in this matter. A further undermining of transatlantic cooperation would therefore ensue - a high price to pay for a mere gesture. Once it became clear that this gesture (after causing a war panic) was not to be followed up, distrust in the seriousness of American intentions would spread. This country would appear as simultaneously war-mongering and too weak to act - the worst of all imaginable positions in the propaganda war.

It follows that such action could only be welcome to the communist leadership. Actually, much of what is done by the satellites suggests an intention on their part to force us into breaking-off diplomatic relations. A break, under the circumstances, would be no more than an empty gesture, helpful to the communist "peace" campaign. The U.S. would appear to have warlike intentions. At the same time, we would have failed to demonstrate our strength. The Kremlin would not change its line, except perhaps to indulge in more such small provocative actions which do not carry with them any serious danger to the communist position. All these considerations are at bottom trite; they come down to the age-old rule that in serious political conflict the use of empty gestures - except where a successful bluff is possible - is the worst of all conceivable methods.

All this does not argue against a policy of active strength, i.e. a policy of limited blows at communism. It only argues that any kind of action undertaken by us must be follwed up to the point where it achieves results painful to the enemy and detrimental to his prestige. If the analysis of Russian intentions given above is correct, the present phase is, in certain ways, uniquely favorable to such action. Previously, we have not had the strength to hit. Now we are becoming increasingly strong, while the enemy camp, aware of the disastrous consequences of war to its very existence, is afraid of falling into the trap of a "provocation."

It is necessary, in this context, to stress that so far the limits of Russian forbearance have never been seriously tested, except by various actions taken by the Finnish government and to some extent by the Berlin blockade. Whenever a serious "no" was spoken, whenever military forces were made available, Russian withdrawal from previously adopted political positions was immediate. It was the policy of Stalin, from 1943 onwards, to test carefully the limits of our forbearance, and never to go "whole hog" before making sure that no grave consequences would ensue. Our own testing of the enemy's forbearance, by contrast, has been fitful,

occasional and unsystematic.

It can be taken for granted that we could do a very great many things before the communist world would switch from yelling to war. For example, disregarding with studied contempt the alleged separateness and individual sovereignty of the satellite states, we might have reacted to the Hungarian affair by marching our troops into the Austrian Muhlviertel, ejecting the small Russian garrison by physical violence and taking as many prisoners as we could; announcing at the same time that we had no warlike intentions, but that this was merely retaliatory for the "Russian-ordered" arrest of our airmen in Hungary. There would have been a paroxysm of fear the world over, and a terrible deflation of Russian prestige in the absence of serious counter-action. (The blow itself, to secure this result, would have had to be taken with lightning speed.) We might then have stated our demands -- such as a heavy financial indemnity for the arrest and mistreatment of the flyers - as a condition of evacuating the Muhlviertel. If my general analysis of Russian intentions is correct, this would not have produced a detrimental effect upon Russian conduct towards us. It would merely have caused the Kremlin to be doubtful about our intentions. It would have strengthened the view that our patience was nearly exhausted and that next time we might start by bombing Moscow. This contributor is convinced that, without at least one such act, the political balance in Western Europe will never become right. Russian prestige can be deflated only by actions, not by words or symbolic gestures alone. In view of the prevailing Russian policy of caution, this is the right moment for such action.

It might be argued that the arrest of a few flyers did not give sufficient grounds for so violent an action. It is doubtful whether that argument is valid. More likely than not, the more disproportionate our reaction appeared, the more it would frighten the Kremlin and the more it would strengthen the party of caution. It is only by some such blow, i.e. an action which, in itself, will not lead to war, that we can test enemy reaction.

Admittedly, if our reaction is very disproportionate to the enemy's provocation, we help his "peace" propaganda more than necessary. It might therefore be advisable not to act after a single incident such as that of the U.S. flyers in Hungary. We might let a few such cases pile up, doing nothing but using more and more indignant language. The world will laugh, but it will laugh no longer, if, after the third or fourth case, we take immediate action of the kind indicated, thus retaliating by one big blow for many pinpricks. We would then create the impression of having shown great patience, but of being able to retaliate when our patience has been exhausted - a good moral case for communist, European and American consumption. The Kremlin would feel that it had gone too far and would seek to retrace its steps at once. Any successful action of this kind would thoroughly disrupt the communist "peace" campaign, since this campaign simultaneously exploits both the longing for peace and the fear of Russian strength. It cannot successfully continue to do so when one of these two pillars falls.

That leads one step further. It is not obvious why the enemy should always take the initiative while we merely react after the Soviet-created event. There is scope for unchallenged initiative on our side. This, of course, has its limits.

To give, merely for the sake of illustration, an absurd case: If American parachutists descended upon Warsaw, that would mean immediate war, whatever the previous plans of the Kremlin. But aside from such extreme cases, there are also actions, highly detrimental to the enemy, which could be undertaken with the certainty that international war would not ensue and that the Kremlin would not be able to retaliate adequately. Support for a lightning internal coup in Albania would offer itself as such a possibility. It would at one blow drive back Russia from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. It would give decisive backing to Tito and, at the same time, make him more dependent upon us. It would leave Bulgaria the only communist country south of the Danube. It would enormously hearten Turkey and Greece. It would reverberate throughout the satellites, filling their peoples with the conviction that one day they too would be liberated. Since Albania is connected with the communist bloc only by air, the enemy lacks any serviceable means of retaliation.

A policy of limited blows, frightening the enemy and testing the limits of his forbearance, calling the bluff of his invincibility and demonstrating our own strength, is the only serious method at our disposal for disrupting the enemy's master plan. It is doubtful whether, even at the peak of our rearmament, we could go to war in a political constellation favorable to ourselves. It would be taking a risk indeed to "go it alone" in a large-scale international war. But we can, without great risk "go it alone" in the Muhlviertel or in Albania, or perhaps against certain objectives in Southeast Asia, and, if success is achieved, we shall reap the prestige which goes with success, both in the enemy camp and in our own camp.

Generally speaking, we would in this way achieve four aims at one blow. We would:

a) convince European and Asian governments that American strength can challenge Russia without provoking immediate war;

b) convince the masses of Europe that, even without the presence of many American divisions, we can protect Europe, since Russia does not dare go to war (this is the decisive point);

c) convince the Soviet Union that we are at the end of our patience, and that any aggressive act on its part may be very dangerous to itself;

d) convince the subject nations of Russia that one day their own liberation will be achieved with our help.

It may also be assumed that, as long as we are not able and/or willing to undertake limited actions of this kind, we are certainly not prepared psychologically and strategically to go to war. But what is here advocated is based upon the assumption that even very limited action would serve as a very effective deterrent to the enemy who does not want war now.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Possible Sources of Information

Russian and satellite refugees and deserters seem to be the only direct witnesses for the questions involved in the above report. It might be suitable to scan this group of persons, in particular, for the following purposes:

I. Army Personnel (U.S.S.R. and Satellite)

Possible changes in the location of troops.
Changes in mobilization plans.
Changes in delivery targets for armaments.
Changes in types of armament orders (defensive instead of offensive).
Air force and air industry personnel, with special reference to the relation between tactical and strategic air force.
Political control personnel of the army, with special reference to tightening of controls and reorganization of unreliable units.

II. Navy Personnel

With special reference to possible divergences of appreciation and planning between army and navy.

III. MGB and MVD

Any new preparations for mass arrests?
With regard to border zones?
With regard to satellite states?
Have targets for the complete communization of satellite populations been shortened?
Any special training of an increased number for services abroad, especially outside communist-bloc countries?
Any measures against a) overstressing of peace campaign?
b) thoughtless aggressiveness in attitudes toward international affairs?
Any signs of a reassessment of impending tasks at the top?

IV. Foreign Office and Foreign Service Personnel

Recent changes of directives toward sharper or toward more cautious attitude?
Closer or more cautious contact with local communist parties?
Sudden insistence on greater friendliness toward certain nations or groups?

V. Party Personnel (especially personnel connected with international communism)

Greater tightening of cadres organization?

Reorganization of control, either by greater centralization in Moscow, or, on the contrary, by greater decentralization?
Training in central schools with greater emphasis on an indirect approach?

VI. Economic Personnel

Shortening of targets?
Increased storing of supplies?
Production shifts to war industry?

This use of suitable personnel should be balanced by an analysis of overt facts, most of which concern Russian foreign policy and the attitude of the communist parties operating outside the countries of the communist bloc. It is assumed that Russian foreign policy is subject to thorough analysis as a routine matter. It should be paralleled by a study of communist policy centering round the communist line since 1947 concerning:

a) Violence vs. indirect means.
b) Isolation vs. alliances.
c) Secret cadres vs. open mass organisation.

Such an analysis should proceed on the basis of:

a) Intelligence material collected in as many countries as possible, especially concerning point (c) as given above, and,
b) By a thorough and comparative analysis of communist policies and especially of communist doctrine and campaigns overtly proclaimed during the period under consideration.

Appendix B

Suggested Research Projects

1. European Communist Policy and American Rearmament

Of all the indications concerning Russian reactions to American rearmament, communist policy outside the countries ruled by communists is the most overt and accessible one. It is therefore suggested that a close study of this policy, especially in Europe, might provide an important clue to Russian policy in the changed circumstances emerging from the Korean war.

Such research should take its starting-point in the beginning of 1949, when quasi-insurrectional tactics in France and Italy were abandoned. It should investigate the slow and gradual change of meaning in the seemingly continuous policy adopted by the communists ever since. Even at first sight, it is clear that the "peace" campaign, which was then launched, involved at first no more than an attempt to paralyze any possible American use of the atom bomb, while Moscow apparently still expected an early resumption of its own political offensive. In 1950, however, the "peace policy" was broadened into a political campaign addressed indiscriminately to all social strata. From the middle of 1951 onwards, there appear attempts to develop this peace campaign into a policy of communist alliances with other parties, as well as to disrupt, under the slogan of a "United Europe," NATO and the anti-communist front. But this is only a general frame-work for a diversified process which has never been analysed.

It is suggested, in the first place, that a detailed study be made of communist tactics in France and Italy with regard to the details of the Korean war, of American rearmament and of the struggle within the United Nations, so as to bring out the extent to which the smaller oscillations of communist policy in these countries were determined by the above-named developments in international politics. It is suggested that, in the second place, there be a detailed investigation of the policies of the British communists during the same period, analysing them as a reflex of Russian intentions towards Britain and of Russian assessments of the British attitude. It is suggested that, in the third place, an analysis of communist slogans and policies in Germany be tied in with the two above-named studies. Finally, it is suggested that a study be made of the smaller Western European communist parties, with special reference to the attempts to divert their countries from NATO, and with a view to discovering, by a comparative study, the changes in the general line of Western European communism under the pressure of international developments. The findings of this investigation should be summarized so as to throw light on the degree of Russian anxiety during various phases since 1949, and on their methods of combating the political effects of growing military strength in this country.

All essential materials are available in the daily and periodical communist press of the countries concerned. Additional material may be made available by personal contacts and investigations.

2. The Italian Communist Party

In the whole ample literature about communism, there does not exist a single work on the communist movement in Italy. Topical news apart, we are vastly ignorant of that movement. This is the more astonishing since the Italian Communist Party is:

a) proportionately the strongest communist party of Western Europe,
b) the party with the most equal distribution of regional influence,
c) the party with the most equal distribution of social influence (influence in various strata),
d) the only communist party in Europe which is still on the upgrade,
e) the communist party which is likely in the near future to assume leadership of the whole of Western European communism.

Concerning (e), it is only necessary to point out that since the removal of Thorez and since the decline of communist strength in France, the French communists have lost some of their preeminence in the European communist movement and that the succession is open. It is more than likely that Togliatti, not Duclos, is now emerging as the outstanding leader of European communism. He has a diplomatic ability on a high international level, such as no French communist leader can boast; and he will be the natural spokesman for a policy of broad maneuvering and of tactical caution, such as can be anticipated as the next phase of communist strategy. Witness that in one December issue of the Cominform Journal he was granted nine columns for an article on tactics, and that he was chosen to announce the far-reaching change of attitude concerning a European union.

The history of Italian communism is short. It had a bad start in the early twenties, and then was completely crushed by fascism. It did not re-emerge before March 1943. From that time onward, with a speed not comparable with the development of any other communist party, it was not only able to gain the support of nearly two-fifths of the population but also able to hold it. We know nothing about the reasons for this success apart from valueless generalities. A detailed study of the conditions of communist influence in Italy in its regional, social, political and ideological aspects is clearly necessary. No less necessary is a study of the communist machine, its methods and its inner structure, with particular reference to the internal dissensions among the leadership, dissensions which seem to be a good deal stronger in Italy than in France.